Deferred Income Annuity Purchases: Optimal Levels for Retirement Income Adequacy

By Jack VanDerhei, Ph.D., Employee Benefit Research Institute

AT A GLANCE

The prospect of outliving retirement savings is a very real risk for many Baby Boomers and Gen Xers. Yet, only a very small percentage of defined contribution (DC) and individual retirement account (IRA) balances are annuitized — and a significant percentage of defined benefit (DB) accruals have been taken as lump-sum distributions when the option was available.

Some believe that cost is an issue: Deferred Income Annuities (DIAs) are designed to reduce the probability of outliving savings by providing monthly benefits in the later stages of retirement. Because of their delayed payments, DIAs could be offered for a small fraction of the cost for a similar monthly benefit through an annuity that starts payments immediately at retirement. Many believe that the lower cost would at least partially mitigate retirees’ reluctance to give up control over a large portion of their DC and/or IRA balances at retirement age.

New research was prepared for this Issue Brief to explore how the probability of a “successful” retirement, measured by the EBRI Retirement Readiness Rating (RRR), varies with the percentage of the 401(k) balance that is used to purchase a DIA. Results are provided for all households (with a 401(k) balance) combined as well as by simulated age of death. The results are also provided by age-specific wage quartiles.

We find that, at current annuity rates, purchases of a DIA at age 65 deferring 20 years with no death benefits result in an overall improvement in RRR (for all ages of death combined) for DIA purchases equal to 5, 10, 15, and 20 percent of the 401(k) balance. However, there is an overall decrease in RRR for DIA purchases equal to 25 and 30 percent — due in part to the interaction with long-term care costs. If a pre-commencement death benefit is added to the DIA, there is an overall improvement in RRR for DIA purchases equal to 5, 10, and 15 percent of the 401(k) balance.

When the results are broken out by age at simulated death, we find overall decreases in RRR for those dying before benefits begin (ages 65–84) as well as for those dying soon after benefits begin (ages 85–89). For each of the groups living beyond age 89 we find an increase in RRR, and, as expected, the larger the percentage of 401(k) balance used to purchase a DIA, the larger the percentage increase in RRR. The results are significantly improved by adding a pre-commencement death benefit for those who die before benefits begin, but this is offset by larger decreases in RRR for those dying between ages 85 and 89 and smaller increases in RRR for those living beyond age 89.

The need for longevity protection is arguably less for those in the lowest wage quartile given their greater reliance on Social Security. We broke out the overall RRR changes by age-specific wage quartiles and found that in all but the smallest DIA purchase (5 percent of the 401(k) balance), households in the lowest age-specific wage quartiles experienced a decrease in RRR from the purchase of a DIA without a pre-commencement death benefit. However, households with higher wages had a much more positive experience, with those in the second age-specific wage quartile experiencing an increase in RRR for all purchases through the 20 percent value. Households in the third age-specific wage quartile experienced an increase in RRR for all purchases simulated (through the 30 percent level).
Jack VanDerhei is director of Research at the Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI). This Issue Brief was written with assistance from the Institute’s research and editorial staffs. Any views expressed in this report are those of the authors and should not be ascribed to the officers, trustees, or other sponsors of EBRI, Employee Benefit Research Institute-Education and Research Fund (EBRI-ERF), or their staffs. Neither EBRI nor EBRI-ERF lobbies or takes positions on specific policy proposals. EBRI invites comment on this research.

Suggested Citation: Jack VanDerhei. “Deferred Income Annuity Purchases: Optimal Levels for Retirement Income Adequacy.” EBRI Issue Brief, no. 469 (Employee Benefit Research Institute, January 3, 2019).

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Deferred Income Annuity Purchases: Optimal Levels for Retirement Income Adequacy

By Jack VanDerhei, Ph.D., Employee Benefit Research Institute

Introduction
Modeling retirement income adequacy for non-retired U.S. households has often been split into an analysis of the accumulation phase (current age until retirement age) and the decumulation phase (retirement age until the age of death). In the last 15 years, the Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI) has conducted a significant amount of research on the impact of various accumulation-phase scenarios; however, only recently has an attempt been made to quantify the impact of the primary decumulation-phase risks: longevity risk, long-term-care and home-health costs, and investment risk.

As part of the assessment of the impact of longevity on retirement income adequacy, EBRI used its Retirement Security Projection Model (RSPM) to establish relative-longevity quartiles based on family status, gender, and age cohort. For the Early Baby Boomers simulated to die in the earliest relative quartile, the Retirement Readiness Rating (RRR) of 75.8 percent was 19.1 percentage points larger than the overall average for this age cohort. The RRR decreased to 63.1 percent in the second relative-longevity quartile and 44.9 percent in the third relative-longevity quartile. For the Early Boomer cohort with the longest relative longevity, the RRR fell all the way to 37.9 percent. Similar influences were found for the younger age cohorts, but there was a noticeable increase in the RRR range between the earliest and latest longevity quartiles: 37.9 percentage points for Early Boomers, 41.3 percentage points for Late Boomers, and 49.2 percentage points for Gen Xers.

While previous EBRI research has attempted to model single-premium immediate annuities (SPIAs) as at least a partial hedge against the longevity risk, given that only a very small percentage of defined contribution (DC) and individual retirement account (IRA) balances have been annuitized (and that an increasing percentage of defined benefit (DB) accruals have been taken as lump-sum distributions when the option was available), the prospect of “outliving” this portion of retirement wealth is a very real risk for many Baby Boomers and Gen Xers. In recent years, the prospect of increasing individual interest in annuitizing retirement savings at retirement has been enhanced through an insurance product that has been designed to provide monthly benefits only after a significant deferral period in retirement. These products could be offered for a small fraction of the cost for a similar monthly benefit through a SPIA, and many believe that the lower cost would at least partially mitigate retirees’ reluctance to give up control over a large portion of their DC and/or IRA balances at retirement age.

In 2014, one of the major constraints of using this type of product was eliminated when the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued final rules for creating a qualifying longevity annuity contract (QLAC) that would be exempt from the required minimum distribution rules that dictate that distributions from DC plans and IRAs must typically begin by age 70½ (significantly earlier than the age at which payments commence for these products).

While it is still too early to know how individuals’ demand for these products and the insurance industry’s supply of QLAC options will eventually modify the market for longevity annuities, it is useful to model the degree to which QLACs can improve retirement security. A 2015 EBRI article models two scenarios under which QLACs are utilized as part of a 401(k) plan and finds that, even at the historically low interest rates prevailing at that time, the transfer of longevity risk provides a significant increase in retirement readiness for the longest-lived quartile, compared with only a small reduction for the general population. Sensitivity analysis on the QLAC premia resulting from likely increases in future interest rates provides even more favorable results.

New research was prepared for this Issue Brief to explore how the probability of a “successful” retirement varies with the percentage of the 401(k) balance that is used to purchase a deferred income annuity (DIA). Results are provided for all households (with a 401(k) balance) combined as well as by simulated age of death. The results are also
provided by age-specific wage quartiles.

**Previous Research on Longevity Annuities**

The concept of longevity annuities as a longevity hedge has been discussed for at least 10 years. In 2005, Milevsky\textsuperscript{12} published a paper analyzing an inflation-adjusted, deferred-annuity contract that would begin payouts not at retirement age but at an advanced age (e.g., 80 or 85). In essence, this contract would attempt to apply basic risk-management principles to retirement planning and would carve out the high-probability/low-severity costs (e.g., retirement income from 65–85) that could be budgeted relatively easily from the typical retirement scenario before transferring the low-probability/high-severity costs (e.g., retirement costs from 85 through the remainder of the retiree’s life) to the insurance company. This would be analogous to accepting a deductible on automobile insurance collision coverage and considered a more efficient method of choosing which risks (or portions thereof) should be transferred to an insurance company.\textsuperscript{13}

In 2007, Gong and Webb\textsuperscript{14} attempted to deal with the fact that rates of voluntary annuitization remained extremely low by analyzing what would happen if longevity annuities were used as a 401(k) plan default. Realizing this had the potential to harm high-mortality households (relative to taking the 401(k) balances in unannuitized form), the authors used numerical-optimization techniques to show that few households would suffer significant losses under this type of default (as measured by the authors’ methodology).

In 2013, Pfau\textsuperscript{15} demonstrated how deferred income annuities (DIAs) expanded the retiree’s “efficient frontier” and provided a case example of how these products could be more effective than a single-premium immediate annuity (SPIA) for a particular objective function.

In 2014, Blanchett\textsuperscript{16} used a utility-based, annuity-preference model to analyze the optimal form of guaranteed income and found that it varied substantially as a function of model assumptions and retiree preferences. He found that nominal SPIAs tended to be the most efficient of the eight annuity types analyzed; however, if nominal DIA-payout rates increased by just 5 percent, they became the most attractive option on average. In a 2015 article, Blanchett\textsuperscript{17} used regression analysis on the optimal DIA allocation for each investor and found evidence that higher allocations would tend to be associated with those who were younger and those who had less existing guaranteed retirement income.

In 2017, Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell\textsuperscript{18} used a life-cycle portfolio framework to show that older individuals would optimally commit 8–15 percent of their plan balances at age 65 to a DIA that began paying out at age 85. They found a welfare increase of 5–20 percent of average retirement accruals as of age 66 if each participant were to select their own optimal rate of annuitization and only a slight reduction in retiree wellbeing if plan sponsors were to default participants into deferred annuities using 10 percent of their plan assets.\textsuperscript{19}

**Employee Interest in Purchasing a QLAC**

As part of the 2015 Retirement Confidence Survey (RCS), workers were asked how interested they thought they would be at retirement in purchasing an insurance product with a portion of their savings that would begin providing guaranteed monthly income for the rest of the worker’s (or their spouse’s) life at some point in the future, such as age 80 or 85. Eight percent of workers indicated they were very interested and 30 percent reported they were somewhat interested, while 21 percent said they were not too interested and 38 percent said they were not at all interested. Figure 1 in VanDerhei (2015) demonstrates that the level of interest in purchasing a QLAC-type product is strongly associated with the respondent’s perceived likelihood of living to age 85. Nearly one-half (47 percent) of those who believed it was “very likely” that they would live until at least age 85 were either somewhat interested or very interested in purchasing such a product; however, this percentage dropped to 41 percent for those who believed it was “somewhat likely” that they would live until at least age 85. One-quarter (25 percent) of those who believed that they were either “not too likely” or “not at all likely” to live until at least age 85 reported that they were interested in
purchasing this type of product at retirement.

Figure 2 in VanDerhei (2015) shows a similar relationship between the level of interest in purchasing a QLAC-type product and the respondent’s perceived likelihood of living to age 95. In this case, more than one-half (53 percent) of those who believed it was “very likely” or “somewhat likely” that they would live until at least age 95 were either somewhat interested or very interested in purchasing such a product. This percentage dropped to 35 percent for those who believed it was “not too likely” that they would live until at least age 95 and 30 percent for those who believed that they were “not at all likely” to live until at least age 95.

Figure 3 in VanDerhei (2015) shows the percentage of workers in the RCS who were either somewhat interested or very interested in purchasing such a QLAC-type product as a function of household income and age. Regardless of household income, workers ages 45 or under were much more likely to be interested in purchasing such a product. At least some of this age discrepancy could be attributable to public perceptions of the future solvency of Social Security. Retirement benefits paid by Social Security represent a major portion of the longevity protection for many retirees, and the prospects of this benefit being modified when the Social Security Trust Fund is expected to be depleted may provide an incentive for younger workers to consider a QLAC-type product as part of their individual risk management.

Figure 4 in VanDerhei (2015) shows that the percentage of workers ages 45 or younger interested in a QLAC-type product was 40 percent for those who believed Social Security would be a major source of retirement income; however, it increased to 47 percent for those who believed it would be only a minor source of retirement income. The portion of those who expressed interest in a QLAC-type product increased to 59 percent for younger workers who believed Social Security will not be a source of income in retirement at all.20

**Previous EBRI Research on QLAC Scenarios**

Several publications on QLACs have appeared since 2014 with emphasis on financial planning for retirement. From a public policy perspective, however, the question of how to increase demand for this product to a point where a significant percentage of new retirees will have this type of longevity hedge remains largely unanswered.

Two potential scenarios that have been discussed involve adding in-plan QLAC purchases to 401(k) plans.21 The first scenario would attempt to convert 15 percent of the 401(k) balance with the current employer (subject to the appropriate dollar limitation) to a QLAC premium and would simultaneously attempt to partially mitigate the risk of purchasing the product when interest rates would be low. This would be accomplished by using a 10-year ladder of purchases based on 1.5 percent of the 401(k) balance each year from ages 55–64.22

The second potential scenario assumes (some) plan sponsors would be willing to convert the accumulated value of their 401(k) contributions (subject to the applicable dollar and percentage limits) in each employee’s plan to a QLAC purchase when the employee reaches retirement age on either an opt-in or opt-out basis for the employee. Of course, there could be several variations on this basic theme, including those involving purchase of the QLACs on an annual basis.23 However, for purposes of the 2015 EBRI research, the simulations under the second option were performed assuming that the purchases would take place with a one-time QLAC purchase at age 65. It is important to note that this type of QLAC purchase would apply only to account balances attributable to the current employer’s contributions. Any amounts attributable to employer contributions with a previous employer are not included in the simulation results.

Figure 1 shows the percentage change in Retirement Readiness Ratings that results from purchasing a 10-year laddered QLAC of 1.5 percent of 401(k) account balances with the current employer from ages 55–64 for households in the longest relative-longevity quartile with a QLAC as well as the impact on all households with a QLAC.24

The increase in the EBRI Retirement Readiness Ratings (RRR) — essentially the probability of NOT running short of money in retirement — for Early Boomers in the longest relative-longevity quartile with a QLAC is only 1.9 percent, but it increases to 2.9 percent for Late Boomers and 3.5 percent for Gen Xers.25 The larger percentage increases for the younger cohorts are largely a function of their larger 401(k) balances as a multiple of earnings.
One problem with performing the simulations using only current annuity purchase prices is the impact of historically low discount rates. In 2014, Moody’s annual “Yield on Seasoned Corporate Bonds — All Industries, AAA” was only 4.16 percent — more than 370 basis points below the average dating back to 1976. The 2012 Individual Annuity Mortality (IAM) Basic Table and observed market prices were used to interpolate for the interest rate that, when combined with the cash flow and mortality assumptions, reproduced the original premium. Using those parameters, a 100-basis-point increase in the interest rate would produce an approximate 21 percent decrease in the premium rate (and a 200-basis-point increase would produce approximately a 37 percent decrease in the premium rate). Sensitivity analysis for this likely reduction in premium rates if interest rates increase at least partially to historical norms was undertaken by repeating the analysis using premium rate decreases of 10, 20, and 30 percent.

When the premium rates are decreased by 10 percent, the percent increase in the RRRs (compared to the baseline of no QLACs) varies from 2.5 percent for Early Boomers to 4.6 percent for Gen Xers. A 20 percent decrease in premium rates increases the range of RRR increases to 3.2 percent for Early Boomers to 5.3 percent for Gen Xers. A 30 percent decrease in premium rates increases the range of RRR increases to 4.5 percent for Early Boomers to 6.7 percent for Gen Xers.

Figure 1 also tracks the change in RRR for all households (including those who do not live to age 85 and thus do not receive any income benefits for their QLAC premiums). The results are typically small (all less than 1 percent in absolute value). Assuming current QLAC premiums, the changes in RRR vary from a decrease of 0.8 percent for Early Boomers to a decrease of 0.5 percent for Gen Xers. At a premium decrease of 30 percent, RRR changes vary from a decrease of 0.1 percent for Early Boomers to an increase of 0.4 percent for Gen Xers.

Figure 2 shows the percentage change in Retirement Readiness Ratings that results from using 401(k) account balances attributable to employer contributions with the current employer at age 65 to purchase a QLAC. The increase in RRR (compared to the baseline of no QLACs) for Early Boomers in the longest relative-longevity quartile with a QLAC is 6.7 percent, but it increases to 7.3 percent for Late Boomers and 8.7 percent for Gen Xers.

When the premium rates are decreased by 10 percent, the increase in the RRRs varies from 8.4 percent for Early Boomers to 11.0 percent for Gen Xers. A 20 percent decrease in premium rates further impacts the range of RRR increases, which vary from 10.7 percent for Early Boomers to 13.5 percent for Gen Xers, while a 30 percent decrease in premium rates leads to RRR increases ranging from 13.3 percent for Early Boomers to 16.2 percent for Gen Xers.

When the change in RRR for all households with a QLAC is simulated in this scenario under the current QLAC premiums, they vary from a decrease of 1.5 percent for Early Boomers to a decrease of 1.1 percent for Gen Xers. At a 30 percent decrease in premiums, RRR values vary from an increase of 0.2 percent for Early Boomers to an increase of 0.7 percent for Gen Xers.
## Figure 1

**Impact of Purchasing a 10-Year Laddered QLAC* of 1.5 Percent of 401(k) Account Balances From Ages 55–64 on Retirement Readiness Ratings, by Age Cohort (Percentage Change)**

*With and without a reduction in QLAC premia*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household in Longest Relative Longevity Quartile</th>
<th>Early Boomers</th>
<th>Late Boomers</th>
<th>Gen Xers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With a QLAC</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With a QLAC, 10% Reduction in Premia</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With a QLAC, 20% Reduction in Premia</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With a QLAC, 30% Reduction in Premia</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**All Households With QLAC**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Early Boomers</th>
<th>Late Boomers</th>
<th>Gen Xers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-0.8%</td>
<td>-0.6%</td>
<td>-0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.6%</td>
<td>-0.2%</td>
<td>-0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.4%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.1%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Qualifying longevity annuity contract.

Gender-specific QLAC app is used.

Source of app = best rates from immediateannuity.com on August 10, 2015.
Figure 2
Impact of Using 401(k) Account Balances Attributable to Employer Contributions With the Current Employer at Retirement Age to Purchase a QLAC* at Age 65 on Retirement Readiness Ratings, by Age Cohort (Percentage Change)

With and without a reduction in QLAC premia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Early Boomers</th>
<th>Late Boomers</th>
<th>Gen Xers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Household in Longest Relative Longevity Quartile With a QLAC</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household in Longest Relative Longevity Quartile With a QLAC, 10% Reduction in Premia</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household in Longest Relative Longevity Quartile With a QLAC, 20% Reduction in Premia</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household in Longest Relative Longevity Quartile With a QLAC, 30% Reduction in Premia</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Households With QLAC</td>
<td>-1.5%</td>
<td>-1.6%</td>
<td>-1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Households With QLAC, 10% Reduction in Premia</td>
<td>-1.0%</td>
<td>-1.2%</td>
<td>-0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Households With QLAC, 20% Reduction in Premia</td>
<td>-0.4%</td>
<td>-0.6%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Households With QLAC, 30% Reduction in Premia</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>-0.1%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EBRI Retirement Security Projection Model® Versions 2305, 2309, 2311, 2313, and 2315
* Qualifying longevity annuity contract.
Gender-specific QLAC app is used.
Source of app = best rates from immediateannuity.com on August 10, 2015.
Optimal Levels of Deferred Income Annuity Purchases for Retirement Income Adequacy

The objective of the new research for this Issue Brief is to explore how the probability of a “successful” retirement varies with the percentage of the 401(k) balance that is used to purchase a deferred income annuity (DIA) where the probability of success is measured by the EBRI Retirement Readiness Ratings (RRR) from the EBRI Retirement Security Projection Model. For purposes of these simulations, we use existing RSPM accumulation modules to simulate retirement income/wealth at age 65 for all US households between 35 and 64. Households with no 401(k) balances at retirement age are filtered out of the analysis, and a retirement age of 65 is assumed.

The baseline stochastic decumulation module is run with an assumption of no annuitization (either SPIA or DIA) and sensitivity analysis on DIA annuitization by assuming various percentages (5, 10, 15, 20, 25, and 30 percent) of the 401(k) balance at retirement are used to purchase a DIA with 20-year deferral. This sensitivity analysis is first performed for DIA purchases without pre-commencement death benefits and then for DIA purchases with pre-commencement death benefits. We assume the percent and dollar constraints for current QLACs are not binding.

DIA Purchases Without Pre-Commencement Death Benefits

Figure 3 shows the percentage change in RRR from various DIA purchases (without pre-commencement death benefits) at retirement by age at simulated death. As expected, anyone dying prior to age 85 (the end of the 20-year deferral period) would have their RRR decreased since they would have had a portion of their 401(k) balance used to purchase the DIA but had not lived long enough to benefit from it. For those dying before 85 and using only 5 percent of their 401(k) balance to purchase the DIA, the RRR would decrease by 0.3 percent. As expected, the RRR decrease is monotonically increasing as the percentage of the 401(k) balance used to purchase a DIA increases. At a 25 percent level the RRR decrease reaches 1.7 percent and at a 30 percent level it is 2.1 percent.

For those dying at ages 85–89, the difference between the cost of the DIA and the present value of the eventual benefits results in a decrease in RRR regardless of the percentage of 401(k) balance used, but the decrease is less than that experienced for those dying prior to 85 for a 5 or 10 percent purchase, but the decrease is greater than that experienced for those dying prior to 85 for 20, 25, and 30 percent due to the interaction with long-term care costs.

For those dying at ages 90–94, the increase in RRR is positive for all DIA purchases, and the larger purchases have larger increases. This trend is repeated for those dying at ages 95–99. For those dying at ages greater than 99, the increase in RRR ranges from 4.0 percent for a DIA purchase equal to 5 percent of the 401(k) balance to 16.2 percent for a DIA purchase of 30 percent of the 401(k) balance.

When the results are aggregated across all ages at death (the last column in Figure 3), there is an increase in RRR for DIA purchases of 5, 10, 15, and 20 percent of the 401(k) balance, but purchases of 25 or 30 percent result in a decrease in RRR.

Given the large proportion of overall retirement income/wealth generated by Social Security (which provides protection against longevity risk) for the lowest age-specific wage quartiles, one would expect that a DIA purchase would be less beneficial for this group, inter alia. This hypothesis is supported by the results in Figure 4, which shows the impact of DIA purchases by age-specific wage quartiles. Similar to the last column in Figure 3, this aggregates across all ages at death but categorizes each household by age-specific (current) wage quartiles.

All the DIA purchase scenarios where at least 10 percent of the 401(k) balance is used result in a decrease in RRR for the lowest age-specific wage quartile. The second age-specific wage quartile has an increase in RRR for the 5, 10, 15, and 20 percent DIA purchases before turning into a decrease. The third age-specific wage quartile has an increase in RRR for all DIA purchases except the one at 30 percent of the 401(k) balance. All the simulated DIA purchases result in an RRR increase for the highest age-specific wage quartile.
DIA Purchases With Pre-Commencement Death Benefits

Figures 3 and 4 were presented at the August 15, 2018 ERISA Advisory Council hearing, "Lifetime Income Solutions as a Qualified Default Investment Alternative (QDIA) – Focus on Decumulation and Rollovers." One of the primary concerns expressed by the Council members dealt with the size of the decrease in RRR for those using a substantial portion of their 401(k) balance to purchase the DIA and then dying prior to the time benefits commence. Fortunately, DIAs are available with a pre-commencement death benefit option where the dollar amount paid to purchase the annuity will be returned to the beneficiary if the annuitant dies before income payments begin (assuming a single-life annuity is selected). However, this option will lower the eventual retirement payments, assuming the annuitant survives until the time benefits commence (age 85 in this analysis).

The problem with using RSPM® to analyze DIA purchases with pre-commencement death benefits is that the original construct of the simulation model was a response to a request from states that needed a projection of whether (and, if so, when) future cohorts of retirees would run short of money in retirement. Since inter-generational transfers were not assumed in this situation, there is currently no capacity to capture the beneficial cash flows arising from a death benefit in three of the four combinations of gender and family status. For example, single males, single females, and the second deaths for a married couple will all result in cash flows to a beneficiary not included in the RSPM® definition of "household.”

As a result, several changes were made to RSPM® exclusively for the analyses included in Figure 5 below. In the case of a death benefit paid to a surviving spouse (i.e., first deaths for a married couple), a lump sum is added to their non-tax-qualified account balance. This would be factored into the future simulated life-paths in much the same way that the after-tax portion of “extra” defined benefit payments would be treated.27

However, in any other situation, a proxy for the death benefit payment was constructed as follows:

- If the household was not simulated to run short of money without the death benefit payment, there was no change in status.
- If the household was simulated to run short of money without the death benefit payment, we assume the present value of the lump sum of the death benefit is used to offset the present value of any retirement deficits accumulated. If it is sufficient to offset the deficits, the “run short of money in retirement” status is reversed. If it is not sufficient to offset the deficits, the “run short of money in retirement” status is not reversed.

Figure 5 shows the percentage change in RRR from various DIA purchases (with pre-commencement death benefits) at retirement by age at simulated death. Similar to Figure 3, most households28 dying prior to age 85 (the end of the 20 year deferral period) would have their RRR decreased since the pre-commencement death benefit would be returned when they die (after the policy was purchased). However, the pre-commencement death benefit substantially reduces the percentage change in RRR (for example, compare the 2.1 percent decrease for a 30 percent DIA for those dying in the first twenty years in Figure 3 with the 0.5 percent decrease for the same situation in Figure 5).

For those dying at ages 85–89, the difference between the cost of the DIA (with pre-commencement death benefits) and the present value of the eventual benefits results in a decrease in RRR in Figure 5 regardless of the percentage of 401(k) balance used. This is similar to the results for the same situation in Figure 3; however, since the benefits are now lower (as a result of the protection from the pre-commencement death benefits), the size of the reduction is larger in Figure 5.

For those dying at ages above 90, the increase in RRR in Figure 5 is positive for all DIA purchases but smaller than those for similar situations in Figure 3 (again, as a result of the protection from the pre-commencement death benefits).

When the results are aggregated across all ages at death (the last column in Figure 5), there is an increase in RRR for DIA purchases of 5, 10, and 15 percent of the 401(k) balance, but purchases of 15, 25, or 30 percent result in a decrease in RRR.
Figure 3
Percentage Change in EBRI Retirement Readiness Ratings From Various Deferred Income Annuity (DIA) Purchases at Retirement, by Age at Death*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of 401(k) Balance at Age 65 Used to Purchase a DIA Deferring 20 Years</th>
<th>65–84</th>
<th>85–89</th>
<th>90–94</th>
<th>95–99</th>
<th>&gt; 99</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5%</td>
<td>-0.3%</td>
<td>-0.1%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10%</td>
<td>-0.6%</td>
<td>-0.3%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15%</td>
<td>-0.9%</td>
<td>-0.9%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20%</td>
<td>-1.3%</td>
<td>-1.5%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25%</td>
<td>-1.7%</td>
<td>-2.3%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>-0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30%</td>
<td>-2.1%</td>
<td>-3.0%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>-0.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For households currently ages 35–64 who have a 401(k) balance at retirement age (65).
* Second death for couples
Source: EBRI Retirement Security Projection Model® Version 3427
For households currently ages 35–64 who have a 401(k) balance at retirement age (65).
Source: EBRI Retirement Security Projection Model® Version 3427
Figure 5
Percentage Change in EBRI Retirement Readiness Ratings From Various Deferred Income Annuity (DIA) Purchases at Retirement, by Age at Death*:
Includes Pre-Commencement Death Benefit

For households currently ages 35–64 who have a 401(k) balance at retirement age (65).
* Second death for couples
Source: EBRI Retirement Security Projection Model® Version 3427
Summary and Future Research

This Issue Brief reviews previous analysis of the ability of QLACs to provide an effective longevity hedge for those Boomers and Gen Xers who are simulated to participate in an in-plan offering either through a 10-year series of laddered purchases or as a one-time purchase based on the accumulated value of employer contributions from the current employer. The analysis finds that, even at the historically low interest rates in 2015, the transfer of longevity risk provides a significant increase in retirement readiness for the longest-lived quartile, compared with only a small reduction for the general population. Sensitivity analysis on the QLAC premiums resulting from likely increases in future interest rates provides even more favorable results.

New analysis is then provided on what might be considered the optimal percentage of a 401(k) balance that should be converted to a DIA if the objective is to maximize the probability of a successful retirement (as measured by the EBRI Retirement Readiness Ratings). We find that, at current rates, purchases of a DIA at age 65 deferring 20 years with no death benefits result in an overall improvement in RRR (for all ages of death combined) for DIA purchases equal to 5, 10, 15, and 20 percent of the 401(k) balance. However, there is an overall decrease in RRR for DIA purchases equal to 25 and 30 percent. If a pre-commencement death benefit is added to the DIA, there is an overall improvement in RRR for DIA purchases equal to 5, 10, and 15 percent of the 401(k) balance.

When the results are broken out by age at simulated death, we find overall decreases in RRR for those dying before benefits begin (ages 65–84) as well as for those dying between ages 85 and 89. For each of the groups living beyond age 89 we find an increase in RRR and, as expected, the larger the percentage of 401(k) balance used to purchase a DIA, the larger the percentage increase in RRR. The results are significantly improved by adding a pre-commencement death benefit for those who die before benefits begin, but this is offset by larger decreases in RRR for those dying between ages 85 and 89 and smaller increases in RRR for those living beyond age 89.

The need for longevity protection is arguably less for those in the lowest wage quartile given their greater reliance on Social Security. We broke out the overall RRR changes by age-specific wage quartiles and found that in all but the smallest DIA purchase (5 percent of the 401(k) balance), households in the lowest age-specific wage quartiles experienced a decrease in RRR from the purchase of the DIA. However, households with higher wages had a much more positive experience, with those in the second age-specific wage quartile experiencing an increase in RRR for all purchases through the 20 percent value. Households in the third age-specific wage quartile experienced an increase in RRR for all purchases through the 25 percent value, and those in the highest age-specific wage quartile experienced an increase in RRR for all purchases simulated (through the 30 percent level).

Future EBRI analysis will offer additional breakouts of the impact of DIA purchases on the probability of retirement success as a function of alternative demographic categories. We will also include scenarios that include DIA purchases based on IRA balances as well 401(k) balances and will attempt to reprice DIA if discount rates approach “normal” levels.
References


_____., “Increasing Default Deferral Rates in Automatic Enrollment 401(k) Plans: The Impact on Retirement Savings Success in Plans with Automatic Escalation.” EBRI Notes, Vol. 33 no. 9 (Employee Benefit Research Institute, September 2012).

Appendix A: Brief Description of EBRI’s Retirement Security Projection Model®

EBRI launched a major project to provide retirement income adequacy measurement in the late 1990s for several states concerned whether their residents would have sufficient income when they reached retirement age. After conducting studies for Oregon, Kansas, and Massachusetts, EBRI developed a national model in 2003 — EBRI’s Retirement Security Projection Model® (RSPM) — and in 2010 it was updated to incorporate several significant changes, including the impacts of DB plan freezes, automatic enrollment provisions for 401(k) plans, and the crises in the financial and housing markets.30 EBRI has updated RSPM® on an annual basis since then for changes in financial and real estate market conditions as well as for underlying demographic changes and changes in 401(k) participant behavior (based on a database of the actual account activity of some 24 million 401(k) participants).

One of the basic objectives of RSPM® is to simulate the percentage of the population at risk of not having retirement income adequate to cover average expenses and uninsured health care costs (including long-term-care costs) at age 65 or older throughout retirement in specific income and age groupings. RSPM® also provides information on the distribution of the likely number of years before those at risk run short of money, as well as the percentage of preretirement compensation they would need in terms of additional savings in order to have a 50, 70, or 90 percent probability of retirement income adequacy.

A previous EBRI publication30 describes how households are tracked through retirement age and how their retirement income/wealth is simulated for the following components:

- Social Security.
- DC balances.
- IRA balances.
- DB annuities and/or lump-sum distributions.
- Net housing equity.
A household is considered to run short of money in this model if aggregate resources in retirement are not sufficient to meet average retirement expenditures, defined as a combination of deterministic expenses from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (as a function of age and income) and some health insurance and out-of-pocket, health-related expenses, plus stochastic expenses from nursing-home and home-health care (at least until the point such expenses are covered by Medicaid). This version of the model is constructed to simulate retirement income adequacy, as noted above. Alternative versions of the model allow similar analysis for replacement rates, standard-of-living calculations, and other ad hoc thresholds.

The baseline version of the model that has been used for this analysis assumes all workers retire at age 65, that they immediately begin drawing benefits from Social Security and defined benefit plans (if any), and, to the extent that the sum of their expenses and uninsured medical expenses exceed the projected, after-tax annual income from those sources, immediately begin to withdraw money from their individual accounts (defined contribution and cash balance plans, as well as IRAs). If there is sufficient money to pay expenses without tapping into the tax-qualified individual accounts, those balances are assumed to be invested in a non-tax-advantaged account where the investment income is taxed as ordinary income. Individual accounts are tracked until the point at which they are depleted. At that point, any net housing equity is assumed to be added to retirement savings in the form of a lump-sum distribution (not a reverse annuity mortgage (RAM)). If all the retirement savings are exhausted and if the Social Security and defined benefit payments are not sufficient to pay expenses, the individual is designated as having run short of money at that point.
Endnotes

1 This includes studies on the impact of freezing of defined benefit accruals (VanDerhei, 2006); the transition from defined benefit to defined contribution plans (VanDerhei, June 2013); a comparative analysis of automatic enrollment 401(k) plans relative to voluntary enrollment plans (VanDerhei and Copeland, June 2008); employer contributions when converting from voluntary enrollment to automatic enrollment and its implications for retirement income (VanDerhei, April 2010); plan design and employee behavior for automatic escalation provisions in automatic enrollment plans (VanDerhei and Lucas, November 2010); and increasing default contributions for automatic enrollment plans (VanDerhei, September 2012).

2 VanDerhei (Spring 2014).

3 See Appendix A for a brief description of EBRI’s Retirement Security Projection Model.


5 One of the primary outputs of RSPM® is the production of Retirement Readiness Ratings (RRRs) for various subgroups of the population. The RRR is defined as the percentage of simulated life-paths that do not run short of money in retirement.


7 Individuals born from 1965–1974.

8 VanDerhei (September 2006), Park (May 2011), and VanDerhei and Copeland (May 2004).


10 For an excellent analysis of the market for longevity annuities, see Abraham and Harris (November 2014).

11 VanDerhei (2015).


13 Scott (2008) demonstrates under several scenarios that longevity annuities maximize guaranteed retirement spending per dollar annuitized.


15 Pfau (September 2013).

16 Blanchett (2014).

17 Blanchett (Spring 2015).

18 Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell (2017).

19 The authors deal with the problem of less positive results for those with substantially higher mortality than the population averages by converting retirement assets into a longevity annuity only for those having at least $65,000 in their retirement accounts.

20 Whether workers responding to the RCS currently have a defined benefit plan is also a factor associated with their interest in purchasing a QLAC-type product: 45 percent of those without a defined benefit plan were interested in purchasing a QLAC-type product, whereas only 35 percent of those with a defined benefit plan indicated they were interested.

21 These scenarios typically include a modification of the current employer liability exposures involved with offering in-plan annuities.

22 Such a proposal would undoubtedly need to be modified to deal with minimum premium requirements from the QLAC providers. More than 20 percent of the 401(k) participants ages 55–64 in the EBRI/ICI 401(k) database would have annual premiums less than $100 (largely due to short tenure and the ability to start taking in-plan withdrawals without a penalty tax after age 59-½).
This would involve several additional considerations, including the status of the QLAC contracts at the time of preretirement job change. Some have suggested that a lack of cash values for QLACs would have a valuable side effect of helping to reduce leakages at job change.

The annuity purchase prices were based on the best rates available at age 65 for a deferred annuity starting at age 85 from immediateannuities.com. The rates were within 1.1 percent of those used by Blanchett (Spring 2015) based on quotes obtained from CANNEX. Gender-specific rates were used in the analysis even though unisex rates would be used for in-plan offerings. Consistent results were obtained when the simulations were repeated using a 50/50 gender mixture. Turner and McCarthy (2013) evaluate the impact of the need to calculate benefits on a unisex basis when offered in a 401(k) plan.

The annuity purchase price charged at that time for an applicant age 65 was used for all individuals, regardless of age. To the extent that future mortality improvements are reflected in the QLAC premia for Late Boomers and Gen Xers, the improvements in RRR would likely decrease from those produced by the current simulations.

Payouts were calculated based on illustrative quotes provided by MetLife as of July 1, 2018.

See Appendix A for more detail.

This would be true in all cases if investment returns in retirement always had a positive rate of return.

A brief chronology of RSPM is provided in Appendix A of VanDerhei (February 2015).

VanDerhei and Copeland (July 2010).